"Capital in the 21st Century,” by Thomas
Piketty, 2013 - Second Review - Part of Chapter III and Chapter IV
Piketty certainly needs an editor. After all, repetition must be the god of his understanding. It is more common in the latter part of his book. Lord! In this part, he turns his attention to
inheritance, the reason for the decrease in inequality from the turn of the
century’s astronomical levels, and its prospects for rising further. The last section is where he advocates solutions
that are mostly left social-democratic. What is interesting about his ‘tax on
wealth’ solution is that he himself calls it ‘utopian’ – much as actual
socialism is also called ‘utopian.’ While
various American reformists like Dean Johnson issued laundry lists of legal
restraints on capital to criticize Piketty, Piketty in a sense dismisses them
all as not getting to the heart of the issue. And that involves an
international solution and a more complete solution. A wealth tax has aspects of a transitional demand. Which shows that
he is actually more perceptive than the left/liberals in the U.S. who peddle
a version of ‘humane’ capitalism, tinkered with by purely nationalist means. His wealth tax would actually have to be
applied across regions, then globally, to work.
And that leaves the door open for a Marxist, internationalist approach,
as capital cannot cooperate on that level.
Piketty’s analysis is heavily grounded in history and
resonates with our common, though anecdotal, knowledge. For instance, his
statistics bear out the fact that the newly-settled U.S.
was for a long time more egalitarian than Europe. He also comments that the South was the most
in-egalitarian place in the U.S.
during slavery. This heritage still
resonates in the south and accounts for the servility of so many southern
whites. It is also refreshing to read something that
is primarily based on non-U.S. statistics – France,
England, Germany, Japan
and Sweden figuring
prominently - with the U.S.
only one among many.
IMPERIALISM
The question of modern overseas earnings from corporations
is not addressed. Determining the amount
of international business and profit that a ‘domestic’ company earns from its
overseas retail, factory and land holdings, labor force wages and contracts with
others would take significant research into each major capitalist firm to
establish a pattern. Piketty says that
most profits now accrue from financial and overseas sources because domestic
industrial capital is not that profitable, but he does not flesh out this view.
Piketty can easily see in 1910 tax records holdings in sovereign debt bonds –
Russia was one – and stock shares in clearly colonial companies like the East
India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Panama or Suez Canals, or land
holdings in a tobacco plantation in Jamaica.
Imperialist earnings for the 1% and the 10% are now hidden under the
rubric of ‘domestic’ value in firms like GE, Wal-Mart or Archer Daniels Midland. Shares in India’s Tata corporation will not
show the 80 countries they invest in. Invisibly,
capital reaches around the world. So this book does not give us the wealth
earned through imperialism, nor is that its intent. Yet as such, it can delude the reader as to
global sources of U.S.
and European wealth.
Due to perhaps a lack of good statistics, he – unlike others
– thinks the U.S. is more
unequal than India or China or other
‘developing’ nations. However, others
have come to the opposite conclusion. He estimates that the upper centiles in
poor countries – India, South Africa, Argentina,
Columbia, China,
Indonesia
- control as much as in rich countries.
He doesn’t join the Bloomberg chorus of trying to describe the Chinese
rich like the American rich, as China
has more capital controls on incoming and outgoing assets, as well as a
non-convertible currency. As such, the Chinese rich are under more controls.
Piketty primarily accounts for the decrease in absolute
inequality from the past, 1910 and earlier, due to the institution of progressive taxes – on estates, income, capital gains, interest, dividends, real estate, etc.
and even capital in general. This has
resulted in less wealth by the dominant class as a percentage, and more by his oddly-named ‘patrimonial’ middle class – patrimonial meaning ‘inherited from a
father.' When you hear the common refrain
of the ‘hollowing out’ of the middle class, the ‘destruction’ of the middle
class, this is the modern reflection of this intermediate strata between big
capital and the working class that became larger in the 20th
century.
In the 20th century, Piketty’s charts show 1910
to be a high point
of wealth, with 1950 as the year wealth began to climb again. The 1970s are the beginning of the true counter-offensive
to return wealth to its normal position, when it starts rising more quickly. In these sections, his special focus is on
inheritance. Inheritance is a somewhat
forbidden topic, as it concerns death and deep family issues. Americans don’t like to talk about it. Yet Piketty isn’t hiding the green laundry. At
present, pre-death ‘gifts’ to children are almost half of all inheritance. Due to parents living longer, most inheritance
occurs for children in their 50s, not their 30s - which accounts for more focus
on ‘careers,’ even for middle-strata children.
One of the signs of growing inequality is that old people die far
wealthier than the living, which is the effect of asset compounding. Or, more pithily, the ‘dead are worth more
than the living.’ Piketty here punctures
another economics’ class fallacy – the “Modigliani triangle,’ which asserted
that all old people save for retirement and die with almost no money. Many do, of course, but the upper classes certainly
do not. His charts show that inheritance
is a chief transmitter of inequality between the classes, and it is
rising.
Piketty’s charts show that inheritance was 25% of national
income at the height of inequality in 1910, and that if present trends
continue, it will reach that level again.
Using mostly French figures, Piketty estimates that inherited wealth in
the 19th and early 20th century was 80-90% of
wealth. Right now it is back up to
around 72%. This, again, is based on
returns on capital outstripping actual economic growth. The latter helps young people, the former
older people.
I am going to list certain points I find interesting, though there is
of course much more. I’m going to quote from the ‘left’ Piketty the most.
- He
continues to dwell on literary descriptions of inequality in the 18th
and 19th centuries and especially focuses on Balzac’s “Pere
Goriot” which has a key scene in which one of the nastier characters, Vautrin,
advocating marrying rich instead of working because it is far more
profitable. Of course this
reflected the time perfectly. Even
now there is still the ‘gold digger’ as a type, though it should not be
limited to women. “Sense and
Sensibility’ and ‘Washington
Square,’ by Henry James also figure
prominently.
- The
richest 10% in the U.S.
accumulated 75% of the growth from 1977-2007 through both income and
holdings.
- Artists,
actors, athletes make up less than 5% of the top earning group.
‘Super-managers’ as Piketty calls them, make up the rest.
- “The
relative power of different social groups often plays a central role in
determining what each worker is paid.” Piketty then echoes the Democratic
Party line that ‘education and technology are the decisive determinants of
wage levels.’ These statements contradict each other.
- “Inequalities at the bottom of the wage
distribution have closely followed the evolution of the minimum wage.” This highlights the importance of the minimum wage. He thinks firms unilaterally setting
wages is inefficient and arbitrary.
- While
Piketty feels that ‘education’ is key to solving inequality, he cannot
track any present relation between growing educations and growing incomes. He discusses how top schools filter out
students from the lower classes; how ‘super-managers’ are compensated, not
by productivity, which is hard to measure, or profits, but by a ‘buddy
system’ of cronies. He mentions the role of ‘luck’ and the role national
differences play in compensation - even though technology and education
are similar across many countries. He
concludes that the top levels in society are not earning what they earn
due to meritocratic skills in technology or education. He says it is more ‘hand in the till’
than ‘the invisible hand.’
- Wealth
is hidden by bad or inadequate tax statistics by national
governments. Obviously in league
with capital. This is especially a
problem in countries like India
or China.
- Household
surveys used by the World Bank etc. to estimate wealth are misleading, as
they are based on self-evaluations.
- His ‘essential’
point is that the progressive tax policies instituted in the face of World War
I and the Bolshevik Revolution are why inequality is not as great as the
sky-high levels of 1910 Europe. He especially uses very detailed French
records to prove this point – themselves products of the 1789 French
Revolution. (A Revolution which
also ended the older son inheriting estates, and instead mandated
distributions equally to all heirs.)
The U.S.
was a leader in instituting very high, progressive tax rates, especially
under Franklin Roosevelt. This also
benefitted the rise of a larger middle class.
- “…conditions
are ideal for an ‘inheritance society’…”
His estimates are based on the supposition that a revolution will
not alter the wealth of the capitalist class. In 1910, 25% of capital flow was from
inheritances, a massive amount. In France in
1910 the inheritance component of wealth was near 90%. Now it is 72% and he predicts it will
return to over 90%.
- Galbraith
wonders where Piketty gets his ‘return on capital’ figure averages of
4-5%. Well, Piketty has charts of
them from his tax studies.
- “Clearly,
equality of rights and opportunities is not enough to ensure an
egalitarian distribution of wealth.”
Equality before the law, of course, is the only ‘equality’
permitted by Democrats.
- “Super-managers’
also become ‘petit rentiers’ with their earnings, i.e. accumulating more
and more wealth that just earns income.
“The entrepreneur always tends to turn into a rentier.’
- The
wealthy in the 18 & 19th centuries had servants and
‘staff.’ From what I can see, today’s
middle class apes them by hiring contractors to do almost everything, eats
out to gain a cook, dishwashter and servant, and shuns ‘menial’ labor or repairs.
- He points out that a
‘meritocratic’ society’s philosophy is harder on those who do not do well
than a patrimonial society, because the ‘losers’ have themselves to
blame.
- “…one-sixth
of each age cohort will receive an inheritance larger than the bottom half
of the population earns in a lifetime.”
- “Rent
(of land or housing) is not an imperfection in the market; it is rather
the consequence of a ‘pure and perfect’ market for capital…”
- “…real
democracy and social justice require specific institutions of their own,
not just those of the market, and not just parliaments and other formal
democratic institutions.” This goes far beyond Democratic Party 'liberalism' or even left-liberalism.
- Wealthy
people earn more with their money than those with less wealth, due to
‘economies of scale’ for those investors.
I.E. they can take more risk, can hire better experts, can purchase
more profitable investments. As a
result, their earnings, as reflected in tax records, university foundation
earnings, the Forbes billionaire list, sovereign wealth fund earnings and
the global wealth reports on ‘high net-worth individuals’ can be up to
8-10% per year. Compound these
earnings and you will get an idea of what is going on. Due to this process, Piketty estimates
that the top 1000th of the world wealthy could end up owning
60% of global wealth. “…which is
hard to imagine in the framework of existing political institutions unless
there is a particularly effective system of repression or an extremely powerful
apparatus of persuasion, or perhaps both.”
Welcome to the new world order!
- “…the
entrepreneurial argument cannot justify all inequalities of wealth…” See Bill Gates.
- “Property
sometimes begins with theft.”
Piketty moderately echoing Prodhon's “Property ... is Theft.” Which shows what
a moderate fellow Piketty is.
- “…the
main effect of inflation is not to reduce the average return on capital
but to redistribute it.” Piketty
points out that inflation hurts the less wealthy and benefits the more
wealthy, redistributing money upwards.
- Saudi Arabia buys low-earning U.S.
government bonds in exchange for (military) protection.
- “…
petroleum rents might well enable the oil states to buy the rest of the
planet…and to live on the rents of their accumulated capital.”
- Figures
on the global balance of payments is negative, when it should be perfectly
equal. Piketty thinks the best
answer as to what happened was that the hidden assets are in tax
havens. (Duh!) This ‘dark wealth’
amounts to nearly 10% of global GDP.
- “…the
upper classes instinctively abandoned idleness and invented meritocracy
lest universal suffrage deprived them of everything they owned.”
Piketty marshals his arguments for a ‘global wealth tax’ by
first calling for economic and financial transparency as absolutely necessary
to understand what is going on. Which is
also the first demand in the Transitional Program of the 4th
International – simplified as “Open the Books!” Hiding
income in tax havens or fake entities, bad or incomplete statistics,
fake prospectuses or accounting reviews, non-cooperation across nations - all help the capitalists hide their wealth. He also recommends increased spending on
colleges, to allow other classes than the rich get good
educations. In his disquisition he
discusses the increased role of the state in the financial system. To him the three pillars of the ‘social’
capitalist state that developed in the 20th century were based on
health, education and social security/pensions.
The older role of the state – called ‘regalian’ in his terminology,
which I think is incorrect – was limited to police, courts, army, foreign
affairs and some administration. This is
the conservative doctrine of the state.
He does not think this ‘leap’ towards a greater ‘social’ capitalist
state will be repeated – unlike the sentiments of many left-liberals, who are nostaligic for the Rosevelts.
Piketty sees this ‘global wealth tax’ as the only way to
really undermine inequality, as the issue is now international, not
national. A tax on oil proceeds would
especially affect the autocratic rulers of the petro-states. Piketty feels that regulations of capital
flows can impede the process, but do not actually address the fundamental
problem. He insists that it is fairer
than the present ‘real estate,’ income and consumption taxes because it gets at
the hidden assets of the wealthy. As it is, 'wealth' per se is not taxed in hardly any countries. Piketty
also thinks that labor migration can even out inequalities. Yet this dovetails with capital’s need for
fluid labor that can easily cross borders.
This does not change the rulers of either the country arrived at or the
country left. In fact it probably just
makes them both wealthier. Public debt
can be reduced through austerity, inflation or a capital tax, and the latter to
him is the best for the working classes.
Piketty acknowledges that a ‘global wealth tax’ still
recognizes the capitalist system and the market, and he thinks this
‘compromise’ makes it desirable. That
was his explanation for the success of progressive income taxes initially. Even the right-wing agreed with them at that
time! Prior to 1910 taxes were almost
nil on any wealth. Of course, these taxes were initiated
under the shadow of labor rebellions, revolutions and strikes around the
world. Paying for WW I was also a
necessity. In essence Piketty claims
this is the only way to save capitalism, as his book is peppered with warnings
about its possible overturn because of inequality. Marxists solved the problem of inequality in
a ‘logically consistent’ way, in his phrase, but he doesn’t want to go that way. So he’s picking the more ‘illogical’ method. He calls for a ‘democratic control of
capital’ which is a contradiction in terms, but says there is no other
solution. Capital, after all, is based
on the exploitation of the majority of people.
The ‘democratic control of capital’ would actually mean its
abolition.
Red Frog
June 19, 2014