New Cold War on China, Monthly Review, Vol. 73, No. 3
This is a very useful, contradictory compilation of
articles on China, part of an annual review.
It will give pause to both China cheerleaders and China haters, as China
is not an issue for rote thinkers. Of
most interest are the introduction on the new Cold War against China, written
by the editor, J.B. Foster; discussions of Chinese political economy and the
Belt & Road initiative; an analysis of China’s international economic role by
Minqi Li; another on tech competition between the U.S. and China by J. Zhao and
lastly, one on the contradictions between Chinese environmentalism and neo-liberal
growth.
I will highlight the significant points.
NEW
COLD WAR
Foster defines China as “neither capitalist nor socialist,” but a ‘post-revolutionary’ state pursuing a ‘sovereign project.’ MR’s history regarding China has vacillated as it deals with the varying periods of “China’s complex reality.” Here Foster quotes Xi Jinping profusely. Foster describes the recent bi-partisan hostile moves by the U.S. and its allies against China – Trump’s trade war, which has been continued by Biden; an encirclement military strategy; sanctions, especially on technology companies like Huawei; pressure on China’s exposed points as a method to split up the country – Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Uighurs and Tibet; and the final goal of bringing down the CCP.
He calls this the New Cold War, which has certainly been going on since Obama. Most of the writers discount the possibility of actual widespread military conflict, but a new cold war does not necessarily involve that. The point of this war is to keep China as a ‘low value’ labor provider to imperial capital. Key here is that the U.S. and its allies do not see the U.N. and national sovereignty as relevant, though China does. They advocate ‘a rules-based order’ run by the U.S. instead.
BELT
AND ROAD
A group of professors from France and Beijing argue that
the Chinese policy is of ‘co-development’ for countries in the periphery and semi-periphery. In their definition this includes some
European countries like Greece, Italy and Portugal… so the ‘peripheries’ are
getting wider and wider.
Co-development involves financing and investment, and building
infrastructure for the New Silk Road’s land and sea routes, with financing
far less odious than the IMF. They describe it as a ‘win-win’ program. However some countries have taken on too much debt, like Sri Lanka; some projects have
defaulted; while these routes provide raw materials for China and export/import
lanes. China has constructed a free
trade agreement in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, Australia and New
Zealand, but not dominated in dollars.
The authors describe China’s ‘market
socialism’ as similar to the USSR’s NEP during the Civil War. The NEP ended in 1928 during the primacy of
the Stalin faction. You could make a claim that this 'NEP' has been going on since 1978 and the victory of the Deng faction in the CCP - 44 years. It is a permanent NEP.
FINANCIALIZATION
Three Chinese professors from Hong Kong and Beijing discuss a sort of ‘definancialization’ in China. At
present China has allowed over 100 foreign banking and insurance entities to
set up shop in China, including Blackrock, Allianz and Credit Agricole. But foreign capital is not yet dominant in
China, as the top 4 Chinese state-owned banks are among the top 10
worldwide. State bank profits are plowed
back into ‘the real sector’ according to them – infrastructure, jobs, social
utilities and regional development. They
describe these banks as social
enterprises.
Foreign direct investment in China – FDI – was $212.5B in
2020. China’s currency has been anchored
to the U.S. dollar since the 1990s. China does have capital controls and the
authors advocate these be extended. Internally
land has become financialized, used as collateral or ‘leased.’ They describe large financial bubbles in
China – in real estate, debt and investment – which the central government has
been unable to quell.
Their main focus is on the growth of the private Ant Group,
whose IPO was shut-down in November 2020 by the central government. Ant is the biggest loan, credit card and microfinance
group in China, partly because they privatized a public money fund. According to stats, 86.6% of Chinese young
people use credit cards and only 42% pay off their debt each month. Many of these are cards from Ant or other
lenders.
State financial institutions have invested heavily in Ant,
which also runs the Alibaba©
e-Commerce platform – China’s Amazon©. Alibaba
is actually headquartered in the Cayman Islands. Ant’s shareholders include many Chinese
public entities, along with foreign firms. On the other hand, the central
government, like regulators in the EU and even in the U.S., are trying to
strengthen ‘anti-monopoly’ measures and so have come after Ant, fining Alibaba and stopping the IPO. Given state support for Ant, this involves a
real ‘contradiction.’ The authors
conclude that financial containment ended when China followed neo-liberal globalism
in the 1990s and this will continue if financialization is allowed to continue
or expand.
I Phone, U Phone, We All Work for Their Phone |
IMPERIALISM
or SEMI-PERIPHERY?
Minqi Li looks at the issue of whether China is an imperialist in the classical sense, and
if China can still be said to be in the periphery. Li says no to both. He contends that China exploits other
countries in the extraction of raw materials and labor time, but China still
exports more labor hours and material to the core imperialist countries than
the reverse. He concludes that China has
moved from a peripheral to a semi-peripheral status. Given the vast size of the Chinese economy, 2nd in the world, this is quite an odd ‘semi-periphery!’
China uses very large amounts of raw materials – in
2016-2017 over 50% of the world’s cement, nickel, coal, copper, steel and high
quantities of pork, rice and cotton – and is the world’s largest importer of
oil, natural gas and coal. Li focuses on Lenin’s description of imperialism
needing super profits, not merely the export of capital. In the latter, while China has $7.32T in
overseas investments, they are mostly in reserves (for instance, U.S. govt.
bonds), loans, trade credits, portfolios.
26% is in FDI – which is a marker of financial power over labor. The
U.S. can buy Chinese goods by issuing dollars, while China has to export labor
time. Li calls this the U.S.’s “seigniorage
privilege.”
Li looks at the concept of unequal exchange – specifically
labor time or “labor terms of trade.”
His conclusion is that “in the neo-liberal era, Chinese capitalism has functioned as a crucial pillar for the
global capitalist economy by transferring surplus value produced by tens of
millions of workers to the imperialist countries.” Li’s figures show that China has now
established exploitative relations with 45% of the world population. 1 unit of Chinese labor can be exchanged for
2 units of labor from sub-Saharan Africa or 4 units of labor from South
Asia. 1 unit of Chinese labor is roughly
equal to low/middle-income countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central
Asia and the Middle East. This contrasts with its labor relation with the U.S.
or other core countries.
As part of this, Li points out that Xi Jinping’s family has
real estate in Hong Kong worth £35M, while his brother had 2 shell companies in
the British Virgin Islands. This off-shoring
behavior is similar to billionaires the world over and funds the international
financial system. The claim that China reduced poverty is true - 'absolute poverty.' However, China still has plenty of relative poverty. The terms are not equal.
Li finishes by looking at the environmental cost of
bringing China even with the U.S. in every production and commodity metric,
starting with cars – a world-crushing impossibility. Another article in the
collection highlights various useful environmental mitigation plans in China –
the Green Wall for one – as well as failures.
Those authors also conclude that complete ‘modernization’ would be
impossible and fatal to the world environment.
TECHNOLOGY
WAR
Junfo Zhao discusses the political economy of the key
integrated circuit industry (IC), which is dominated by the U.S. Integrated
circuits are the heart of the computer industry. He puts it in the context of “intercapitalist and interstate
competition.” China has run a trade deficit in ICs – as imports in 2020 were
$350.9B while exports were $117.1B. The U.S.
uses export controls, intellectual property rules and opposition to technology
transfers to blunt progress by China.
However other capitalists still want access to China’s large market and
cheap, quality labor, so there is no solid consensus, though the politicians
have reached one on high-tech. China
leads in low-value production and packaging of ICs, but the U.S. leads in
engineering design – a high value-added labor input. The U.S. wants China to
stay that way, at a disadvantage in the international labor exchange. Yet as David Harvey noted in "The Anti-Capitalist Chronicles" (reviewed below) China is catching up in technology across the board.
Zhao concludes that comparisons with U.S. and Chinese GDP
and PPP indicate a U.S.-China 'hegemony contest' is flawed concept, as China is
still behind. Zhao indicates that
Chinese profit rates have declined since 2010, from 20% to 12.4%. Zhao also uses a version of Li’s labor time
analysis to evaluate unequal relations.
Many Chinese workers work 6 days a week, 12 hours a day, in order to
produce goods – a situation described by Zhao in which the U.S. and “China’s ruling elites” in the
“coastal provincial governments, export manufacturers and their lobbyists” want
to continue.
The MR articles are all over the map, as China’s hybrid
political and economic system obscures a clear view of the class character of
the Chinese state. I don’t think it is
fully capitalist nor socialist, but closest to a ‘deformed workers’ state,’ led
by a bureaucratic Communist Party which still partially represents the
interests of Chinese workers but has also made a pact with capital. In a way it is a version of a bureaucratic Social Democracy.
P.S. - The bankruptcy of Evergrande in China has revealed that the Chinese property sector went from being a practical housing project to a property casino. Michael Roberts reports that 4 other major private property firms are near bankruptcy, but he thinks the government will be able to forestall a general meltdown due to its control of the financial sector.
Prior blog reviews on this subject, use blog search box,
upper left, to investigate our 14 year archive:
“The Musings of the Professors,”
“China 2020,” “The Cultural Apparatus of Monopoly Capital,” “The Fall of Bo
Xilai,” (all 4 Monthly Review
articles); “Two Sea Changes in World Political
Economy,” “Is the East Still Red?” “China – the Bubble That Never Pops,” “From
Commune to Capitalism,” “The End of the Revolution,” “Jasic Factory Struggle,”
“China’s New Red Guards,” “The Rise of China…” (Li); “Hard Like Water,”
“Striking to Survive,” “China on Strike,” “Maoism and the Chinese Revolution.”
And I bought it at May Day Books!
Red Frog
August 24, 2021
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